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Administrative, Judicial and Natural
Systems: Agency Response to the
National Environmental Policy

Act of 1969
Richard Alan Liroff*
The quality of the American environment stands in mute testimony
to the neglect or undervaluation of ecological considerations in public
and private decisionmaking. The nasty environmental impact of government actions in particular is often attributed to the lack of efficient
policy coordination among federal agencies. More often than not, however, it is the product of the value biases and selective perceptions of
agency decisionmakers, reinforced by symbiotic relationships developed
with clientele groups and with Congress.
This essay is an attempt at synthesizing selected theoretical material
on administrative behavior and decisionmaking with several recent court
decisions concerned with administrative response to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (hereafter the NEPA).1 The NEPA's
enactment marked the recognition by Congress that the gross neglect of
environmental impacts could no longer be tolerated, and that a greater
effort had to be made to assure that a full, fair accounting of environmental costs would be incorporated into future agency decisions; the
Act can be interpreted as a call for environmentally coordinated rational
*
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decisionmaking. But as an analysis of agency structures and processes
will suggest, the information necessary for rational decisionmaking can
often be consciously or unconsciously ignored in resolving questions of
environmental choice. Most importantly, the internal structure and external social environment of most administrative agencies discourage the
full evaluation of environmental costs.2 The division of labor within
agencies, the nature of their short-term goals and reward structures all
discourage ecologically innovative decisionmaking. Actions are often
undertaken which provide immediate, readily-perceived economic gratification, while the accompanying short- and long-term ecological costs
remain neglected or underassessed.
While it would be hoped that the Council on Environmental Quality
(hereafter the CEQ), the primary environmental advisory group in the
Executive Office of the President, would compensate for some of these
inherent decisionmaking weaknesses, an analysis of its role will suggest
that it is not primarily concerned with, and is not capable of, conducting
a comprehensive project-by-project review of agency actions.
Given this state of affairs, the courts can play a significant role in
policing the environmental decisionmaking of government agencies.
The NEPA places on agencies the burden of demonstrating that they
have fully weighed all the environmental costs of their actions-it stipulates that environmental consequences must be considered throughout
the entire range of government activities and it establishes a decisionmaking procedure which must be observed by all agencies. The Gilham Dam' and Calvert Cliffs4 decisions, in particular, suggest how
the courts may insist that agencies' compliance with these requirements
be more than mere symbolic gestures of consideration for the environment.
I.

ThE

NEPA

The NEPA, enacted January 1, 1970, declares that it is national policy (1) to encourage "productive and enjoyable harmony between man
and his environment" and (2) "to promote efforts which will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the
2. Throughout this article, the word "environment" and its derivatives will often be
unmodified. The reader should be able to understand from the context those instances

in which it refers to the natural environment, and those in which it refers to a social
environment.
3. Environmental

Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers

of the

United

States Army, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
4. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. A.E.C., 1 ELR 20346 (D.C.
Cir. July 23, 1971).
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health and welfare of man."5 Congress noted that each person should
enjoy a healthful environment and stated that:
[I]t is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use
all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations
of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable
and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of
our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use
which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of
life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources. 6
The Act is a synthesis primarily of two measures, S. 1075 and H.R.
6750, considered in the 91st Congress. As originally introduced, both
measures sought to establish an environmental advisory board in the
Executive Office of the President and a national environmental policy,
but neither included action-forcing provisions to insure that federal
agencies would abide by the policy declaration. It was not until after
the Senate hearings on S. 1075 that Senator Henry Jackson, Chairman
of the Senate Interior Committee and S. 1075's author, amended his
bill to include a number of significant action-forcing provisions that
ultimately became Section 102 of the NEPA:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the
United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance
with the policies set forth in this Act, and (2) all agencies of the
Federal Government shall(a) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will
insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and
the environmental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking
which may have an impact on man's environment;
(b) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality .
5.
6.

42 U.S.C. § 4321.
42 U.S.C. § 4331.

. .

. which
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will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities
and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations;
(c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement
of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal
official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise
with respect to any environmental impact involved ...
(d) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to
recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves
unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources; . . .
(g) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning
and development of resource-oriented projects; and
(h) assist the Council on Environmental Quality . .. .
While the expression "to the fullest extent possible" modifies all these
requirements, it is not to be used as an escape clause by reluctant agencies. The conferees' report was quite clear in this regard:
[I]t is the intent of the conferees that the provision "to the fullest
extent possible" shall not be used by any Federal agency as a
means of avoiding compliance with the directives set out in Section 102.

Rather, the language . . . is intended to assure that all

agencies of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives set out in said section "to the fullest extent possible" under
their statutory authorizations and that no agency shall utilize an
excessively narrow construction of its existing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance.8
Sections 104 and 105 of the NEPA indicate that the action-forcing
obligations of Section 102 are to be treated as supplementary to existing
authorizations-they are in no way regarded as affecting the specific
7. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(a-d, g, h).
8. H.R. Rep. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 9, 10 (1969).
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statutory obligations of agencies to coordinate and consult with other
agencies or to act or refrain from acting upon other agencies' recommendations or certifications. However, these sections are not to be
abused so as to avoid compliance with the Act.9
Title II establishes the CEQ as an advisory board in the Executive Office of the President. The board is given the responsibility of assessing
current and future environmental trends, developing national policies,
assisting the President in preparing a yearly environmental report, and
advising the President with respect to the compliance of existing federal
programs and activities with the policies elaborated in Section 101 of
the Act.

II.

THE

CEQ GUIDELINES

The CEQ was established by Executive Order, in accordance with the
NEPA, on March 5, 1970.1° Shortly thereafter, it issued interim guidelines" elaborating on the environmental impact statement process stipulated in Section 102(2)(c). The regulations especially emphasize the
importance of considering alternatives to proposed actions:
In particular, alternative actions that will minimize adverse impact
should be explored and both the long- and short-range implications
to man, his physical and social surroundings, and to nature, should
be evaluated in order to avoid to the fullest12 extent practicable undesirable consequences for the environment.
The guidelines also require agencies to establish in-house procedures
for identifying those actions requiring statements, and suggest that agencies should interpret the statutory clause "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" with a view to
the overall, cumulative impact of proposed programs.1 3
Section 7(a)(i) of the guidelines elaborates on the content requirements of the impact statement. Agencies should discuss
[t]he probable impact of the proposed action on the environment,
including impact on ecological systems such as wild life, fish and
marine life. Both primary and secondary significant consequences
for the environment should be included in the analysis. For example, the implications, if any, of the action for population distri9.

They are to be interpreted in the same manner as the phrase "to the fullest

extent possible." Id. at 10.
10. Exec. Order No. 11514, 3 C.F.R. 531 (1971 Supp.).
11. Issued April 30, 1970. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390. These have been replaced by a
new set of guidelines, but the language pertinent to thiis discussion remains unchanged.
See 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (April 23, 1971).
12. Section 2. Id. at 7391.
13. Section 5(b). Id. at 7391.
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bution or concentration should be estimated and an assessment
made of the effect of any possible change in population patterns
land use, water, and public
upon the resource base, including
14
services, of the area in question.
Section 7(a)(iii) reiterates the importance of discussing alternatives to proposed actions:
A rigorous exploration and objective evaluation of alternative actions that might avoid some or all of the adverse environmental effects is essential. Sufficient analyses of such alternatives and
their costs and impact on the environment should accompany the
proposed action through the agency review process in order not to
foreclose prematurely options which might have less detrimental
effects. 15

Section 7(a)(vi) requires agencies, where appropriate, to discuss the
problems and objections raised in the review process by other federal
agencies and state and local entities.' 6 Whereas the NEPA had only envisioned one statement, the CEQ guidelines discuss two-a draft and a
final. The draft is to be circulated for comment, while the final state17
ment presumably discusses the solicited critiques.
Section 10 emphasizes the importance of inputting environmental
considerations as early as possible to the agency decisionmaking process:
The principle to be applied is to obtain views of other agencies at
the earliest feasible time in the development of program and project proposals ....
. . . It is important that draft environmental statements be
prepared and circulated for comment and furnished to the [CEQ]
early enough in the agency review process before an action is taken
in order to permit meaningful consideration of the environmental
issues involved.' 8
Section 11 indicates that the NEPA should be applied to programs
initiated prior to January 1, 1970. With respect to such projects,
[w]here it is not practicable to reassess the basic course of action,
it is still important that further incremental major actions be
shaped so as to minimize adverse environmental consequences. It
is also important in further action that account be taken of environmental consequences
not fully evaluated at the outset of the
19
project or program.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 7392.
Section 10(b). id. at 7392.
Sections 10(a) and 10(b). Id. at 7392.
Id.
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The directives to fully evaluate all alternatives, maximize interdisciplinary information input, and develop environmental analysis capabilities are all underscored by the legislative history of the NEPA. 20 In
introducing the bill to Congress, for example, Senator Jackson stated:
In the past, we have established costly programs without a clear
enough perception of the objectives and goals we seek to attain.
We need to know what the risks are, and we need to know what
options and alternatives are available in the development of
our resources and in the administration of our environment. It is
far cheaper in human, social, and economic terms, to anticipate
these problems at an early stage and to find alternatives before they
require the massive expenditures we 2are
now obligated to make
1
to control air, water, and oil pollution.
He had earlier stressed the need to overhaul the decisionmaking process
in the introduction to a report to his committee on a national policy for
the environment:
Throughout much of our history, the goal of managing the environment for the benefit of all citizens has often been overshadowed
and obscured by the pursuit of narrower and more immediate economic goals.
This report proposes that the American people, the Congress,
and the Administration break the shackles of incremental policy22
making in the management of the environment.
A fuller description of this incremental policymaking, within the context of a broad discussion of administrative systems, will identify some
of the principal limitations on comprehensive administrative reform for
environmental ends.
III.

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS

For analytical purposes, it is useful to treat government agencies as
task-oriented complex open systems. This systems perspective is not
only helpful in understanding administrative behavior in general, but is
especially appropriate for the study of such behavior as it impacts on the
20.
Cong.,
history
mental
21.
Before

See H.R. Rep. No. 91-765, supra note 8, passim, and S. Rep. 91-296, 91st
1st Sess., passim (1969).
For a fuller, supporting evaluation of the legislative
of the NEPA see Peterson, An Analysis of Title I of the National EnvironPolicy Act of 1969, 1 ELR 50035 (1971).
Statement of February 18, 1969 cited in Hearing on S. 1075, S. 257 and S. 1752
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at

27, 28 (1969).

[Hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].

S. COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (Comm. Print 1968), cited in Senate Hearings,
supra note 21, at 30.
22.
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environment. The key to comprehending man's place on Earth is
to understand his impact on ecosystems-those sets of interrelationships linking organisms with one another and with their air, water,
and soil environments. By focusing on the nature and amount of
information on natural systems developed in environmentally impacting administrative decisions, it is possible to obtain some sense of the
appropriateness of existing administrative structures on decisionmakmng processes for making environmental choices.
Each agency can be viewed as a system of interrelated individual be24
haviors.2" The system exists within a particular social environment;
from it, resources and information are drawn and demands are made.
The resources, information and demands are processed by the agency
and converted to outputs. These, in the form of regulations, grants,
licenses or permits, are inputs to systems in the agency's environment.
As such, they affect these other systems' outputs, which are the future
demands on and resources available to the agency in question.
The passage of the NEPA can be seen as an attempt by Congress to
maximize the input of environmental information to agency decisionmaking processes. But truly rational environmental decisions within
agency systems will nevertheless rarely be made, for the conditions for
rational choice are usually absent and the need to assure organizational
survival discourages giving full weight to environmental factors.
Rational Decisionmaking Within Agency Systems. Presumably, for a
rational decision to be made, a goal has to be clearly selected, all alternative means towards achieving the goal must be known, and all the
consequences of each alternative means must be considered. 2 5 But rationality is constrained by the organization's structure, which can be
viewed as a restricted communications network.2 6 The web of chan23.

Lawrence and Lorsch, Differentiation and Integration in Complex Organization,

12 AD. Sci. Q. 1, 3 (1967).
24. J. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION 6 (1967).

[Hereinafter cited as

THOMPSON].
25. J. MARCH AND H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 136 (1958).
[Hereinafter cited as
MARCH AND SIMON]. Theoretically, under the terms of the NEPA, no single transpor-

tation, energy, or land use decision can be made except within the context of national

transportation, energy, or land use policies. Such policies would presumably focus on
alternative means of maintaining environmental quality for a particular period of
years while meeting transportation, energy, and land use needs. This view of the
NEPA is underscored by the suit challenging the AEC's decision to request funds for
a liquid metal fast breeder reactor program. See Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. A.E.C., Civil No. 1029-71 (D.D.C., filed May 25, 1971), 1 ELR 65153.
No Section 102 statement was prepared before the request for funds was made. Presumably such a statement would have to discuss the comparative advantage of various
energy policies, including one of discouraging increased energy demands.
26. D. KAITZ AND R. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 225 (1967).
[Hereinafter cited as KATZ AND KAHN].
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nels influences the distribution and condensation of information within
the system. It affects as well the characteristics of information inputted
from and outputted to the environment.27
When a particular problem is posed, it will evoke a certain "response
set" from a decisionmaker which enables him to define the situation the
problem presents. This definition, according to the organization theorists James March and Herbert Simon, represents a "simplified, screened
and biased model of the objective situation."2' 8 Filtering will affect all
the elements figuring in the decisionmaking process-knowledge or assumptions about future events, knowledge of sets of alternatives available for action, and knowledge of consequences attached to alternatives.2 9 Consequently, attention will be focused on certain content
areas.30 Indeed, as the sociologist Phillip Selznick has noted, an organization may acquire a particular character-development of a distinctive competence or inadequacy to frame and execute specific policies,
and embody, within its structure, selected values."'
When an organization has been coping with one kind of problem over
a long period of time, it is likely to evolve a complete, highly organized
set of responses.3 2 For example, the Federal Power Commission had
for years routinely approved hydroelectric power generation plants, assuming that such plants must be licensed to meet growing power demands. Court rulings in both Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference
v. F.P.C. a and Udall v. F.P.C.3 4 suggested that the Commission had
35
routinely excluded ecological considerations in such decisionmaking.
Should the standard operating procedures be inadequate in organizational problem solving, search is begun for a new way of coping with a
situation consistent with decisionmakers' goals. But the search process
is itself biased, with perception of the environment and processing of
communications from it reflecting variations in the training, experience,
social location and goals of decisionmakers. With time and other re27.

MARCH AND SIMON supra note 25, at 168; R. CYGERT AND J. MARCH, A BEFIRM 107 (1963).
[Hereinafter cited as CYGERT AND MARCH].
28. MARCH AND SIMON supra note 25, at 154-155.
29.
Id.
30. KATZ AND KAHN supra note 26, at 277.
31. P. SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION 36 et seq. (1957). [Hereinafter
cited as SELZNICK].
32. MARCH AND SIMON supra note 25, at 141.
33. 354 F.2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1965), 1 ELR 20292, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
34. 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
35. There is little assurance that the first of the two court rulings has had much
impact on the F.P.C., for the Commission has again granted a license to Consolidated
Edison to construct the power plant. And again, the Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference has moved to challenge the license in court.

HAVIORAL THEORY OF THE
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sources at a premium, they must often act on limited information.
Decisions based on the limited evaluation of alternatives have come to
be known as "satisficing" decisions, for unlike optimizing or rational decisions, they are not based on the full evaluation of all the consequences
of all possible means of achieving an objective.
A similar conclusion concerning the bounded rationality of administrative decisionmaking derives from the "incrementalist" school of policy analysis. Administrative decisions are not perceived as rational, as
based on a comparative analysis of all possible alternative actions and
their consequences-they consist, rather, of a series of disjointed and
incremental choices. According to this schema:
1. Each choice consists only of the comparison and evaluation of
incremental (i.e. small) changes.
2. Consideration is given to but a limited number of policy alternatives.
3. Analysis is reconstructive; an impossible problem is not fruitlessly attacked, but is altered so as to make it manageable.
4. Analysis and evaluation are serial-the same problem is continually reattacked and the renewed attacks make less alarming the neglect of certain consequences at previous stages.
5. There is a remedial orientation; "public problem solving . . .
is dominated less by aspiration toward a well-defined future
state [than] by identified social ills that seem to call for remedy."
successive approxima6. Problem solving, in sum, is a series of
30
tions in defining and solving a problem.
An interweaving of these theoretical constructs of satisficing and incremental decisionmaking suggests that it is possible for certain values
to be excluded from the decisionmaking process if they are not shared
by satisficing decisionmakers and those with whom they interact-for
the alternatives which are apparent to decisionmakers are solely the
product of their biased perception of the environment. Furthermore,
the continued neglect of the same consequences over an extended period
of time may systematically create situations which cannot be remedied;
incremental decisionmaking as it relates to the environment cannot always compensate for opportunities lost and environments destroyed. In
his introduction of S. 1075 to the Senate, it was precisely this remedial
assumption which Senator Jackson attacked:
Many of our approaches and programs have involved merely a
cosmetic approach--clean-up, paint-up, and fix-up. The condi37
tions we are dealing with, however, are not cured by cosmetology.
36.
37.

C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 144 et seq. (1965).
Cited in Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 27.
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And the Senate report on S. 1075 added:
The longer we delay meeting our environmental responsibilities,
the longer the growing list of interest charges in environmental deterioration will run. The cost of getting on to38a sound basis for the
future will never again be less than it is today.
As previously noted, the NEPA and the guidelines can be seen as
efforts to overcome the ecological shortcomings of incremental agency
decisionmaking by requiring exposure of proposed projects to a multiplicity of perspectives. With many reviewers of varied backgrounds
evaluating a project, it would be hoped that all its environmental ramifications would be elucidated. Unfortunately, most reviews will be cursory at best. First, project reviews necessarily compete for reviewing
agencies' scarce time and resources with other demands of more critical
importance. Second, because of the vagueness of the NEPA and the
CEQ guidelines, reviewing agencies often lack substantive criteria on
which to base analyses. Therefore, they often are not able to critically
evaluate a project in a well-ordered, comprehensive manner. Third and
lastly, overly severe criticism of others' actions may produce undesired
reciprocal criticism of a reviewing agency's own pet projects.
Negotiated Environments and Organizational Maintenance. An agency's decision to abstain from criticism is one of a number of alternative
strategies available to it. Through selection of an appropriate strategy,
an agency will seek a "negotiated environment" 3 9-a set of highly predictable interrelationships which serve to reduce in number and buffer
unexpected threats to organizational well-being. This quest for selfpreservation and organizational maintenance requires development of a
favorable balance of constituencies.4 0 Organizational goals must be
manipulated 41-agencies must "discover, identify, or manufacture suitable combinations of means and ends to yield effective incentives for the
constituents [they desire]." 4 2 Organizations will emphasize scoring
well on those criteria most visible to important elements in their environment. When they cannot hope to show improvement on all, they
seek to emphasize those of interest to elements on which they are most
dependent.43 Thus, for example, if an agency's survival is dependent
38. S. REP. 91-296, supra note 20, at 16-17.
39. CYGERT AND MARCH supra note 27, at 102, 119.
40.

Holden, Imperialism in Bureaucracy, 60 A. POL. Sci. REv. 943 (1966).
SELZNICK supra note 31, at 66.
42. Holden, supra note 40, at 943.
43. THOMPSON supra note 24, at 90. As open systems, agencies are dependent
upon inputs from their environments. The composition of the environments, the location within them of particular capacities, will determine upon whom, in particular,
each agency is dependent.

41.
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more on its contributions to economic development than on its role in
preserving the environment, it could be expected that it would not take
the latter role very seriously.
Organization theorists' outlines of organizational systems and their
environments dovetail with political scientists' descriptions of administrative, congressional and interest group behavior: Interest groups and
congressional committees can be seen as "significant actors" within each
agency's environment whose demands and support are very influential in
agency decisionmaking. In the example below of the Army Corps of
Engineers, the coincidence of organizational maintenance requirements
with clientele and congressional demands makes for a mutually supportive negotiated environment for all concerned.4 4
The Corps has a substantial civil works program designed principally
to improve navigation and flood control. It is in the Corps' organizational self-interest to encourage requests for and approval of river and
harbor projects. Most congressmen, particularly in election years, like
to have public works projects approved for their district. The shortterm economic benefits are usually quite high, with substantial employment provided for those in the construction trades. In the long-run,
navigational improvement and flood control contribute to industrial and
commercial development.
Projects are not approved by Congress on an individual basis, but in
one package, the Omnibus River and Harbor and Flood Control Bill.
Since each individual congressman wishes to see his project approved,
even if its supporting benefit-cost analysis45 is of dubious validity, he
will of course not seriously challenge questionable projects of others.
Moreover, since a congressman may want a project in the future, he
44.

A. MAASS, MUDDY WATERS:

THE ARMY ENGINEERS AND

THE NATION'S RIVERS

(1951); Drew, Dam Outrage: The Story of the Army Engineers, 225 THE ATLANTIC
51 (1970); K. Mucideston, Water Projectsand Recreation Benefits, in CONGRESS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (R. Cooley and G. Wandesforde-Smith,
PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966).

eds., 1970); G.

MCCONNELL,

45. Benefit-cost analysis is the primary economic tool for making public investment decisions. Its rationale is quite simple-for each dollar invested more than one
dollar should be gained. The method becomes controversial when the estimated magnitude of particular costs and benefits is challenged or when it is felt that certain
factors have been unjustly excluded from calculations. Benefit-cost analysis is most
useful when dealing with relatively simple, closed systems and with easily quantifiable
benefits and costs. Consequently, its validity is questionable when it is applied to
projects having substantial ecological impact-impact on highly complex, open systems. Furthermore, analyses often implicitly incorporate an analysis of political costs
and benefits. See sources cited supra note 44; B. HANNON AND J. CANNON, THE
CORPS OUT-ENGINEERED, and T.H. WATKINS, Crisis on the Eel in THE POLITICS OF
ECOSUICIDE (L.L. Roos, ed., 1971); FLORIDA DEFENDERS OF THE ENVIRONMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE CROSS-FLORIDA BARGE CANAL WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS
ON THE OKLAWAHA REGIONAL ECOSYSTEM

(1970).
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would not wish to alienate the Corps by questioning its calculations,
for it would be the Corps which would undertake feasibility studies establishing the viability of the future project.
Even where the congressman himself does not perceive the need for
a project, such may be seen by local industrial and transportation interests, especially if they have close social connections with the Corps.
One vehicle for these ties is the Water Resources Congress, whose
more than seven thousand members include congressmen, army engineers, and contractors. Affiliated with the Water Resources Congress are fifty state groups, water and land development associations,
and local government agencies.
Individuals or groups can ask elected representatives to obtain project feasibility studies from the Corps. Little effort is required on the
part of the legislator to request such studies, which mark the beginning
of yet additional study-authorization-funding cycles. While the Corps
will not return favorable reports in all instances, the non-critical legislative approval procedure certainly permits the endorsement of environmentally marginal projects-the full evaluation of ecological costs
is not encouraged, their calculation merely reducing the projected economic viability of any project. Hence, the Corps' finely negotiated
social environment, which assures its institutional survival, may wreak
havoc on the natural environment.
The civil works program, while satisfying the Corps' needs, has been
a threat to other agencies. The Small Watershed Program of the Soil
Conservation Service, originated in 1954, provides an example of how a
program can be designed to protect one agency's clientele relationships
from disruption by a second. The watershed program is a public works
endeavor, on a smaller scale than the Corps', designed to prevent floods
and to maintain basic soil productivity. Two students of the S.C.S.'s
growth and development, R. Burnell Held and Marion Clawson, have
noted that the genesis of the program lay in the increasingly active rivalry between the S.C.S. and the Corps, between 1944 and 1954, over
development of upstream areas. The conflict was dampened with passage of the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act of 1954,
which enabled the S.C.S. to develop watershed projects for smaller watersheds while reserving larger watersheds for the Corps. The political
ramifications of the S.C.S. program have been described as follows:
The program has also made sense for SCS, given the political milieu in which it has had to operate. The agency could hardly expect the support of farmers in its struggles against Corps encroach-
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ment into rural areas, when the Corps could offer so much more
favorable terms. In self-defense, therefore, SCS embraced the
small watersheds idea. But it was perhaps more than a defense
weapon; it also enabled SCS to build support among farmers for
the whole range of conservation programs ....
. . . Though one may criticize the Small Watershed Program in
general, one must also admit that it was generally no worse, and in
some respects was better, than the flood prevention programs of
the Corps of Engineers. As long as the latter exist, SCS and its
supporters must seek to gain something equally good
for their pro46
gram; no political realist could expect anything else.
The emphasis on public works by the S.C.S. has, until recently, met
largely with the same uncritical approval from Congress that greets
Corps programs. While satisfying the needs of local economi6 interests
and congressmen and helping the S.C.S. in achieving its goal of organization maintenance, it has also caused widespread environmental
47
disruption.
These case studies empirically illustrate the importance of the quest
for a negotiated environment. In attempting to assess the likelihood of
future agency compliance with the NEPA's demand for ecologically innovative decisionmaking, the need for organization survival and the
preservation of clientele relationships cannot be neglected. The NEPA,
by requiring wide consultation and explicit consideration of hitherto
neglected or underassessed environmental impacts, is a fundamental
challenge to the comradely relationships that are the bedrock of agencies' negotiated environments. By requiring inter-agency consultation
and a complete record of alternatives considered and environmental impacts weighed, the NEPA places the burden of proof on an agency to
show that it has fully weighed all the environmental impacts of an action and that it has rigorously evaluated a multiplicity of alternatives.
The standard operating procedures, the terms of reference which were
the basis of past administrative decisionmaking, are no longer adequate,
according to the NEPA, if they fail to include a thorough environmental evaluation. But because thorough studies may challenge the wisdom
of many projects hitherto not subject to rigorous explicit environmental evaluation mandated by law, it is quite questionable whether agencies will, in good faith, conduct investigations which may threaten
their welfare; the enjoining of several Corps of Engineers projects is
46. R.B. HELD AND M. CLAWSON, SOIL CONSERVATION IN PERSPECTIVE 79 (1965).
47. Hearings on Stream Channelization Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., (part I) passim (1971).
[Hereinafter cited as Stream Hearings].
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instructive in this regard.4 s Even the requirement that analyses be
filed with the CEQ, in the Executive Office of the President, provides
little incentive for recalcitrant agencies. As the discussion below will
indicate, the CEQ is ill-prepared to play the role of environmental ombudsman.
IV. THE CEQ
Title II of the NEPA is the synthesis of several proposals considered
by Congress for an environmental advisory board. Since prior to congressional hearings on the subject, the President had established an inter-agency cabinet committee on the environment,49 the administration
opposed the congressional proposals for a full-time advisory board, independent of the Cabinet and patterned after the Council of Economic
Advisors.50

The hearings revealed, however, that a CEQ in the form presently established would have decided advantages over an inter-agency council.
Most importantly, it would have greater independence from congressional and clientele demands; it would be free to produce more telling
critiques of agency policies. Moreover, while a norm of reciprocal noncriticism might exist in conferences of officials having vested program
interests to protect, the CEQ would have no such restraining "territorial
imperative" 5 1-while inter-agency meetings would tend to reach agreements based on a least common denominator solution, the CEQ would
5 2 Its pohopefully be a catalyst for substantial administrative change.
tentially unpopular and controversial role was noted in the congressional hearings by the political scientist Lynton Caldwell, who noted
that its members ought to be "exceptionally free from political ambition," for effective service on the Council would probably preclude
subsequent election to public office. 3
The legislative history of the NEPA strongly underscores the primary
role of the CEQ as confidential advisor to the President:
The Board's recommendations to the President are for his use
alone, and his actions on their recommendations will depend on the
48. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United
States Army, supra note 3; Sierra Club v. Laird, 1 ELR 20085 (D. Ariz. June 23,
1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States
Army, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971). For a more complete list of recent environmental litigation involving the Corps, see Hearings on Supplemental Appropriations Bill
for 1972 Before the House Committee on Appropriations,92nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 3363

(1971).
49. Exec. Order No. 11472 (May 29, 1969), 3 C.F.R. 459 (1971 Supp.).
50. See, e.g., Walter Hickel's testimony. Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 73.
51. The phrase "territorial imperative" is Stewart Udall's, id. at 142.
52.

Id. at 120.

53.

Id. at 132.
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confidence he places in the judgment of the persons he nominates
to membership on the Board. 4
Yet there was some anxiety expressed that not having fixed terms for
the advisors would hinder their frankness. Representative Henry Reuss
proposed, for example, that members be selected for six year terms, for
"there might be times in which the members of the Council should be insulated from Presidential pressure so they can speak up if they must.
" I'-5
As such a provision was not enacted, it must be acknowledged

that the feared constraints on the Council's freedom to speak may well
exist. As the Council of Economic Advisors does not publicly criticize
executive economic programs,5 6 so too must it be assumed that the CEQ
observes discreet public silence when it disagrees with executive policy.
Furthermore, the legislative history of the NEPA also supports the
view that a project-by-project review and commentary by the Council is
not implied by the Act:
[I]t is intended that the Board will periodically examine the general direction and impact of Federal programs in relation to environmental trends and problems and recommend general changes
in direction or supplementation of such programs when they appear to be appropriate.
It is not the Committee's intent that the Board be involved in
the day-to-day decisionmaking processes of the Federal Government ....57
But this view is perhaps compromised by additional remarks directing
the Council to publicly discuss environmental issues. The Interior Committee noted the on-going controversy concerning pesticide usage, remarking that the extent of the dangers from pesticides was often minimized or denied by government agencies despite competent scientists'
warnings to the contrary. In a muddied environmental debate of this
kind, the CEQ would hopefully present a clear, balanced analysis of the
issues:
It is the committee's strong view that there needs to be some one
place in government to which the public and the news media may
turn for authoritative and objective information on particular environmental problems .

. .

. The Board could provide a useful and

needed public function by reviewing all of the facts and furnishing
competent judgment and advice on problems of this nature. 58
54.

S. REP. 91-296, supra note 20, at 25.

55.

Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 66-67.

56. See C. SILVERMAN, THE PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC ADVISORS
BERY, THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS (1961);
(1965).
S. REP. 91-296, supra note 20, at 25.
Id. at 24.

ADVICE AND PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP

57.
58.

(1959); R. CANTERE. FLASH, ECONOMIC
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It follows, therefore, that if an executive agency provides an inadequate
explanation of a pesticide licensing or spraying program in an environmental impact statement, the public could expect the CEO to fully describe the program's true ecological costs.
A number of constraints operate however to restrain the Council
from public ombudsmanlike activity. First, in indulging in public debate over specific projects, it violates its mandate to be confidential advisor to the President. Even though the citations above suggest that it
may have two roles to play, its assumption of the public role may
severely jeopardize its effectiveness in White House councils, staff meetings, and at the Office of Management and Budget. Second, the CEO
operates on a very small budget and has but eighteen professional staffers. 9 Of these eighteen, only six comprise the federal impact evaluation staff. Since the Council receives approximately three hundred statements per month, and it has not hired any omniscient philosopher kings,
it is difficult for it to rigorously evaluate the adequacy of all statements.
Agencies know that in the average case they will not hear from the
CEO at all.
The important function of the CEO is not so much its review of individual projects as its shaping of new legislation and its promulgation of
broad policy proposals. Its main focus is not on "school-marming" the
agencies, as one CEO official put it,6" but on persuading the Congress to
take significant legislative action to influence agency rules. Such a legislative focus is evident from the President's 1971 environmental program, which includes recommendations for a national land use policy,
a power plant siting law, and comprehensive improvement in pesticide
control authority. 6 1
Because its project evaluation takes place in private within the executive branch, the Council's impact on individual projects of questionable
value is not totally clear. In the resolution of executive conflict, the
environmental costs and benefits are weighed together with economic
and political costs and benefits. In those instances where the non-environmental considerations tip the balance in favor of an ecologically
questionable project, it is plausible that the courts will see fit to intervene in the administrative decisionmaking process.
59.

COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

(2nd annual

report) at 359 (1971).
60. Interview with the author, October 14, 1971.
61.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE PRESIDENT'S 1971 ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRAM at 103, 207, 239 (1971).
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THE ROLE OF THE COURTS

It would be foolhardy to suggest that no decisionmaking reforms
have derived from passage of the NEPA. But for all the reasons previously discussed, it would be equally absurd to suggest that administrative compliance has been, and can be expected to be, total. It cannot
be forgotten, certainly, that successful litigation to assure agency compliance with previous, more delimited statements of environmental policy
has pre-dated the NEPA by at least five years. 62 In fact, in most of
the recent lawsuits in which the NEPA itself was cited, it was invoked
along with a large number of previously enacted statutes. 63
The role of the courts can be evaluated within a systems framework.
Most importantly, the adversary process permits the rigorous evaluation
of decisionmaking processes-agencies' development, communication,
and evaluation of information. In addition, the availability of judicial
relief promotes the inputting of environmental information to the administrative decisionmaking process-environmental groups know that
the concerns they voice can only be ignored by agencies at the risk of
suit. While agencies still have to anticipate the sanctions of congressional committees and clientele groups, their weight must be balanced
against the legal sanctions that may be obtained by environmentalists.
The ecology groups have become, in short, significant actors in the
agencies' environments. The CEQ itself has recognized the importance
of their legal actions:
[C]itizen litigation has not only challenged specific government
and private actions which were environmentally undesirable. It
has speeded court definition of what is required of Federal agencies under environmental protection statutes. The suits have
forced greater sensitivity in both government and industry to environmental considerations. And they have educated lawmakers
and the public to the need for new environmental legislation.6 4
Two recent court decisions, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers"5 and Calvert Cliffs' CoordinatingCom62. E.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608 (2nd Cir.
1965), 1 ELR 20292, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941; Udall v. F.P.C., 387 U.S. 428
(1967); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
aff'd 425 F.2d 97 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
63. Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act (1966), 49 U.S.C. § 1653
(f); The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934 (as amended), 16 U.S.C. § 661 et
seq.; The Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq; The Multiple Use-Sustained
Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 et seq.
64. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY supra note 59, at 155-156.
65. Supra note 3.
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mittee v. Atomic Energy Commission," suggest that the courts can demand more than mere symbolic administrative compliance with the
NEPA requirements. Agency procedures will have to be designed to
assure maximum input of environmental information, and inputted data
will have to be weighed in a non-arbitrary, non-capricious manner.
Obtaining Judicial Review: A Slight Digression. To use the courts,
citizens must overcome various obstacles to judicial intervention in administrative action. First, it must be demonstrated that the case has
been brought before the proper court. 67 Second, it must be shown
that the litigation is timely and that all administrative remedies have
been exhausted.68
Third, a decision must be reviewable. Section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act (hereafter the A.P.A.) declares that:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject
to judicial review. 6 9
The Supreme Court, in Abbot Laboratoriesv. Gardner,held that courts
should restrict access to A.P.A.-permitted judicial review "only upon
a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent.'' 70 In Citizens' Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, the
Second Circuit ruled that:
There can be no question at this late date that Congress intended
by the Administrative Procedure Act to assure comprehensive review of "a broad spectrum of administrative actions," including
those made reviewable by specific statutes without adequate review
provisions as well as those for which no review is available under any
71
other statute.
Fourth, and most importantly, plaintiffs must have standing to sue.7 2
66.

Supra note 4.

67. For example, in responding to a suit challenging Tennessee Valley Authority
contracts for strip-mined coal, the T.V.A. insists that the suit should not have been
brought in the Southern District of New York. See, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. T.V.A., Civil No. 71-919 (S.D.N.Y., filed March 2,1971).
68. In two challenges to the A.E.C.'s exclusion from hearings of evidence on nonradiological thermal pollution, courts ruled that the A.E.C.'s actions did not represent
"final agency action." See, Thermal Ecology Must be Preserved v. A.E.C. 433 F.2d
524 (D.C. Cir. 1970) and Lloyd Harbor Study Group v. Seaborg, Civil No. 70-1253
(E.D.N.Y., filed April 2, 1971), 1 ELR 20188. In Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp.
99 (D. Alaska 1971), part of the Sierra Club's case was dismissed because the organization had not used all administrative remedies available to it.
69. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
70. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967), citing Rusk v.
Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-380 (1962).
71. 425 F.2d 97, 102 (2nd Cir., 1970) (emphasis added).
72. For an oft-cited discussion of the standing question see Davis, The Liberalized
Law of Standing, 37 U. Cmi. L. REv. 450 (1970). In addition to meeting the require-
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Significant changes in the traditional concept of standing have been a
major factor in the plethora of environmental cases reaching the courts
in recent years.

Scenic Hudson PreservationConference v. F.P.C.7 1 is

the leading case cited in the literature on the liberalized rules of standing. In allowing this legal challenge to F.P.C. licensing of a power
project, the court indicated that it was not necessary for a group to
demonstrate economic injury in order to be granted standing:
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational,
and recreational aspect of power development, those who by their
activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such
areas, must be held 74
to be aggrieved parties under §313(b) [of the
Federal Power Act].
Standing has also been granted to groups adjudged "aggrieved" under
section 702 of the A.P.A. 75 In Road Review League, Town of Bedford
v. Boyd, 76 the district court, after citing sections of the Federal Highway Act 77 to the effect that administrative decisions must weigh the

impact of roads on parks and historic sites, ruled that such laws, under
the principles of Scenic Hudson, were sufficient to manifest Congressional intent that conservation groups would be considered aggrieved
by agency action allegedly disregarding their interests. The court saw
no difference in the meaning of "aggrieved" in the A.P.A. from its
meaning in the Federal Power Act. This view was reinforced in the
district court decision in Citizens' Committee for the Hudson Valley v.
Volpe:
The rule, therefore, is that if the statutes involved in the controversy are concerned with the protection of natural, historic, and
scenic resources, then a congressional intent exists to give standing
to groups interested in these factors and who allege 7that
these fac8
tors are not being properly considered by the agency.
ments noted supra, an individual must present a case which satisfies the case and controversies clause of article HI of the United States Constitution. The individual must
be able to present a case vigorously and with "concrete adverseness" (Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
The dispute must be presented "in an adversary context
and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution." (Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968)).
73. Supra note 33.
74. Supra note 33, 354 F.2d 608 at 616, 1 ELR 20292 at 20294.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 702. "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."
76. 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) at 661.
77. 23 U.S.C. § 134, 138; 23 C.F.R. § 1.6(a).
78. Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), af 'd 425 F.2d 97 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
In its decision, the court cited the Department of Transportation Act, supra note 4,
and the regulations of the Corps of Engineers, 33 C.F.R. 209.330. These call for the
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The most recent Supreme Court decision applicable to the standing
question is Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,Inc. v.
Camp,7 9 in which the Court pronounced two criteria which plaintiffs
must meet to obtain standing:
[W]hether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has
caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise.
* * * [W]hether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.80
Under the criteria established in Data Processing, Scenic Hudson, and
other decisions, environmental groups have successfully obtained standing to sue in the Second, Fourth, and District of Columbia Circuits. 8 '
In the Ninth Circuit, however, the court has twice denied standing to
national or local environmental groups. In Alameda Conservation Association v. California,the court commented:
The Association does not assert that any of its rights or properties
are being infringed or threatened ...
Standing is not established by suit initiated by this association
merely because it has as one of its purposes the protection of the
"public interest" in the waters of the San Francisco Bay. . . . Althe concept
though recent decisions have considerably broadened
82
of standing, we do not find that they go this far.
Similarly, the court decided in the Mineral King case, Sierra Club v.
Hickel:
We do not believe that the Sierra Club's complaint alleges that it
or its members possess a sufficient interest for standing to be conferred. There is no allegation in the complaint that members of
the Sierra Club would be affected by the actions of defendantsappellants other than the fact8 3that the actions are personally displeasing or distasteful to them.
As the latter case has been docketed for review by the Supreme Court,
a new decision on standing, focused particularly on environmental cases,
can be expected shortly.
consideration of project impacts on, among other things, fish, natural resources, and
recreational opportunities.
79. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
80. Id. at 152, 153.
81. E.g., E.D.F. v. Finch, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970); E.D.F. v. Hardin, 428

F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek

Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971); Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley
v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), af 'd 425 F.2d 97 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert.
denied 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
82. 1 ELR 20097 at 20098, 2 ERC 1175 (9th Cir., Jan. 19, 1971).
83. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, sub. nom.

Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 U.S. 907 (1971).
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The Gilham Dam Case. The district court decision in the Gilham Dam
case sets a precedent for the rigorous evaluation by the courts of the
adequacy of environmental impact statements; a thorough discussion of
alternatives, benefits and costs is expected. In the words of the court:
At the very least, NEPA is an environmental full disclosure law.
The "detailed statement" . . . should, at a minimum, contain
such information as will alert the President, the Council on Environmental Quality, the public and, indeed, the Congress, to all
known possible environmental consequences of proposed agency
action. Where experts, or concerned public or private organizations, or even ordinary lay citizens, bring to the attention of the
responsible agency environmental impacts which they contend will
result from the proposed agency action, then the § 102 statement
should set forth these contentions and opinions, even if the responsive agency finds no merit in them whatsoever. . . . The record
should be complete. Then, if the decisionmakers choose to8 4ignore
such factors, they will be doing so with their eyes wide open.
The Gilham Dam project had been authorized by Congress in 1958
and construction had begun in 1963. While two-thirds of the money
for the project had been expended, construction had not begun on the
dam itself, one of six proposed by the Corps for the region. Were the
others to be completed, the Cossatot River, on which the dam was to
be built, would be the last major free-flowing stream in the area.
The Environmental Defense Fund, with several other groups as coplaintiffs, filed suit to enjoin further work on the dam. Among the
laws cited as providing the basis for complaint were the NEPA, the
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934,85 the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act,"' and the fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution. The court dismissed all but the NEPA as bases for action. The environmental groups were granted standing, with the court
citing Data Processing, Scenic Hudson, Citizens' Committee for the
Hudson Valley and other cases as precedents.
The decision was contained in a series of five memoranda issued over
a period of four months. While no impact statement had been released
prior to the court action, one was issued just after the suit was filed,
on October 5, 1970, and a revised version was released on January 22,
1971. The court found both quite insufficient. It noted in particular
that the statements did not adequately set forth all the environmental im84.
85.
86.

325 F. Supp. 728 at 759.
16 U.S.C. § 661 et seq.
16 U.S.C. § 1271 et seq.
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pacts, all the adverse environmental effects, or all the irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources engendered in the proposed action. Among the specific details lacking were (1) the "identification
of existing 'food chains' in the area and a discussion of their importance
and the effects of impoundment thereon,"8 7 and (2) a discussion of
the effects of flow level fluctuations and impoundment on biological
productivity and stability, on shoreline vegetation, and on quantities of
downstream alluvial deposits. The court noted the plaintiffs' substantial evidence that the project would result in a downstream ecosystem
that would be less diverse and less stable than that of the undisturbed
stream.
The court was especially concerned with the lack of discussion of
alternatives to the dam, particularly that of not disturbing the stream:
The most glaring deficiency . . . is the failure to set forth and
fully describe the alternative of leaving the Cossatot alone.
Furthermore, the statement does not adequately consider nonstructural alternatives for flood control, such as flood plain management . . . , private or publicly subsidized insurance, or outright acquisition of the fee title to the land in the flood plain.1 8
The court could well have added that most of these alternatives, by
their non-structural character, would not require Corps activity, and
therefore were not in the organizational interest of the Corps to discuss.
The court noted, moreover, that it did not appear that methods and
procedures had been developed by the Corps, in consultation with the
CEQ, to assign a value to the Cossatot as a free-flowing stream, though
testimony by an expert witness for the Environmental Defense Fund
had suggested that such a valuation was possible. The court observed,
furthermore, that there was an abundance of flat water (i.e. lake) recreation in the area, and that to continue the Cossatot as a free-flowing
stream would be to retain some variety in the water and recreational resources of the region.89
The court stated that it was Congress' responsibility to monitor the
validity of project benefit-cost analyses. It noted that the methods of
calculating benefits and costs are "innumerable" and "esoteric," and that
it did not believe it should substitute its judgment for Congress'.9 0
Similarly, in response to the plaintiffs' apparent complaint that the
87. 325 F. Supp. 728 at 748.
88. Id. at 761.
89. This would be supportive of the substantive NEPA goal of maintaining
"wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual
choice." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(4).
90. 325 F. Supp. 728 at 740.
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Corps purported to justify the project by including purposes not contained in the original congressional authorization, 9 ' the court indicated
that it is solely Congress' prerogative to determine if a project is proceeding in accordance with its desires. 92 These statements are reflective
of the traditional philosophy of judicial restraint and as such, ignore the
question of whether the Congress will indeed be moved to closely examine the changing justifications for previously authorized projects.
Though not wishing to involve itself in benefit-cost evaluation, the court
moved to assure that Congress, its acritical proclivities notwithstanding, would be provided with alternative views of the Corps' accounting practices. After describing one alternative analysis in particular, it stated that ". . . a critical analysis of defendants' economic claims
by those opposing the project . . . should be included in any complete
93
impact statement.

The court noted again the exclusion of the "no dam alternative"
when discussing the Corps' claims for water quality benefits. This
section of the opinion is worth quoting in full, for it describes an incremental reasoning process which excludes a number of possible future
alternatives:
It will be recalled that both impact statements claimed benefits
for the project from "enhanced water quality" or "water quality

control."

Since the Cossatot in its present free-flowing state ap-

pears to be of very high quality, pure, and substantially free of

pollution, the Court had some difficulty in understanding the defendants' position. It appears that the reasoning is as follows: After the construction of the dam, defendants believe that there will
be increased economic and industrial development, with resulting
population growth, especially in the area below the dam. This
growth and development will, based on past experience, result in
the pollution of the river in the future. Therefore, the dam is designed to store a certain quantity of water which may later be
released to dilute the pollution and thereby enhance the water quality. This is the same type of "bootstrap" argument which the defendants use in one of their claims for flood control benefits:
The dam will result in new economic and industrial development
and population growth, which obviously will result in the construction of many new structures in the present flood plain, the
value of which structures will then be protected from flood by the
dam. Although the reasoning is circular, it is not without merit.

It appears to the Court that the defendants are correct in believing that if the dam is constructed, then there will be increased eco91.
92.
93.

Benefits can be inflated by changing or adding purposes.
325 F. Supp. 728 at 754-755.
Id. at 761.
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nomic and industrial development below the dam and, as a consequence, increased pollution and increased construction. But the
Court does not believe that a proper claim for water quality benefits resulting from the dam can be made without at the same time
including some statement with regard to the water quality "costs"
from the destruction of the Cossatot as a freewhich would result
94
flowing stream.
Note that if the Corps were to advocate flood plain zoning in conjunction with dam construction, it might not be able to claim benefits for reduced flood damage. But, then, costs might exceed benefits and remove any economic legitimacy the project might have.9 5 Moreover,
once zoning was considered in conjunction with the dam, it would follow logically that zoning alone might reduce damage without the added
cost of destroying the Cossatot.
Furthermore, claims for water quality benefits from low-flow augmentation9 6 are questionable in the absence of a demonstration that
such augmentation will be necessary. If alternative means of pollution
control, such as secondary or tertiary treatment or recycling, are imposed on industries locating in the area, 97 perhaps no such augmentation
would be required. In short, the Corps had mentioned some, but not
all, of the possible future alternatives and consequences. It is not surprising that those selectively included in the statement were supportive of the Corps' dam effort.
The court also dealt with the general question of applying the NEPA
to on-going projects-those originated before the Act's passage.9 8
While not suggesting that the status of the work should be ignored in
determining whether to proceed with the project, the court added, in
words sure to be cited in many future decisions:
[The court] is suggesting that the degree of completion of the work
should not inhibit the objective and thorough evaluation of the en[A]s
vironmental impact of the project as required by NEPA. . ..
the Court interprets NEPA, the Congress of the United States is
intent upon requiring the agencies of the United States government . . . to objectively evaluate all of their projects, regardless
94.

Id.

95. If costs exceed benefits, Congress will not approve a project.
96. Low flow augmentation refers to the seasonal release of impounded water
when river levels are low. Such augmentation helps dilute the constant amount of
polluting effluent entering a stream.
97. Requiring industries and towns to treat their own waste would be consonant
with the generally accepted economic principle that those responsible for creating
pollutants should shoulder the burden of their treatment, thereby reducing their cost to
society.
98. See discussion infra p. 46.
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of how much money has already been spent thereon and regardless
of the degree of completion of the work.99
The Gilham Dam decision was one of the first extensive court discussions of an impact statement's contents. It demonstrates that the many
consequences of an action ignored in agency decisionmaking systems
can be identified and evaluated through the judicial adversary process.
The court's continual references to the plaintiffs' expert testimony on
ecosystem stability and diversity suggest that we can expect increased
judicial use of thorough analyses of the natural systems consequences
of agency actions.
Though it is unfortunate that the costs of assuring more rational environmental decisionmaking have to be borne by aggrieved environmental litigants, the marshalling of expert testimony on ecosystems, on
benefits and costs, and on non-structural alternatives to agency projects
should hopefully encourage agencies to avoid legal challenges by conducting thorough analyses themselves. While forcing Congress to
weigh identified ecological costs is another matter entirely, at the administrative level there can be no excuse for a decision based on review
of unjustly few alternatives. No longer is it legitimate for a statement
to be merely a rationalization for a particular action. The level of satisficing behavior will have to be raised to the point where ecological impacts are routinely considered and critically weighed.
The Calvert Cliffs Case. Agency behavior within a particular structure of formal decisionmaking requirements was challenged in the Gilham Dam case. In the Calvert Cliffs case, in contrast, formal decisionmaking rules themselves were disputed. At issue were four sections of
the AEC guidelines implementing the NEPA. 10 0 The four guidelines
actually served to exempt whole classes of agency action from the
NEPA requirements.' 0 ' They were blatant violations of the letter and
spirit of the law-they limited the number of on-going projects to
which the Act applied and ignored the requirement that environmental
factors be considered throughout the entire decisionmaking process.'
99. 325 F. Supp. 728 at 746. (Emphasis added).
100. Amending 10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix D. Issued December 4, 1970. 35
Fed. Reg. 18469.
101. Before passage of the NEPA, the A.E.C. had successfully argued that it was
not required to consider broad environmental impacts, though it recognized a mandate
to consider the specific radiological hazards caused by its actions. State of New
Hampshire v. A.E.C., 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969).
102. The digest of the decision, 1 ELR 20346 at 20346, describes the rules and the
court's findings concerning them:
... (1) the AEC's refusal to independently review the nonradiological environmental impact of nuclear power plant operations upon which state or
other federal agencies have already passed conflicts with NEPA's mandate to
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Their mere promulgation itself illustrates the CEQ's inability to ensure
that all agencies fully implement the Act.
The court's decision often reads like the sarcastic scolding of a
naughty child by its father:
The period of the rules' gestation does not indicate overenthusiasm
on the Commission's part.
We believe that the Commission's crabbed interpretation of
NEPA makes a mockery of the Act. What possible purpose could
there be in the Section 102(2)(C) requirement (that the "detailed
statement" accompany proposals through agency review processes)
if "accompany" means no more than physical proximity-mandating no more than the physical act of passing certain folders and papers, unopened, to reviewing officials along with other folders and
papers? . . . NEPA was meant to do 3 more than regulate the flow
bureaucracy. 10

of papers in the federal
The court emphasized that the NEPA's procedural guidelines "establish a strict standard of compliance" and are non-discretionary:
[A]I1 of these Section 102 duties are qualified by the phrase "to
the fullest extent possible." We must stress as forcefully as possible that this language does not provide an escape hatch for footdragging agencies; it does not make NEPA's procedural requirements somehow "discretionary."
Congress did not intend the Act
10 4
to be such a paper tiger.
It was reiterated that there could be little excuse for non-compliance
with the NEPA:
[T]he Section 102 duties are not inherently flexible. .

.

.

Con-

siderations of administrative difficulty, delay or economic cost will
not suffice to strip the section of its fundamental importance. 10 5
[T]he Commission's [action] seems based upon what it believes to
be a pressing national power crisis. .

.

Whether or not the

spectre of a national power crisis is as real as the Commission apthe relevant agency to assess the complete environmental costs of its action on
a case-by-case basis; (2) the AEC's failure to require hearing board review of
nonradiological environmental factors unless affirmatively raised by outside
parties or staff members violates the Commission's affirmative duty to consider environmental values at every stage of the decision-making process;
(3) the AEC's refusal to consider nonradiological environmental factors at
hearings officially noticed before March 4, 1971 violates NEPA's mandate
that such factors be taken into account by each agency to the fullest extent
possible from the time the act went into effect on January 1, 1970; (4) the
AEC's refusal to consider alteration of plans, backfitting or construction
halts for nuclear facilities which were granted construction permits prior to
the effective date of NEPA but for which operating licenses have not yet been
granted, so as to allow for interim modifications of these facilities consonant
with environmental values, is inconsistent with the Commission's duty to fully
consider action which will avoid environmental degradation.
103. 1 ELR at 20349, 20350.
104. Id. at 20348.
105. Id. at 20349.
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parently believes, it must not be used to create a blackout of environmental consideration in the agency review process. 10 6
The decision here, as in the Gilham Dam case, noted the importance
of preparing detailed studies of impacts and alternatives so that outside
observers could independently evaluate the environmental considerations:
[B]y compelling a formal "detailed" statement and a description
of alternatives, NEPA provides evidence that the mandated decisionmaking process has in fact taken place and, most importantly, allows those removed from the initial process to evaluate and
balance the factors on their own. 1 07
NEPA requires that an agency must-to the fullest extent possible under its other statutory obligations-consider alternatives to
its actions which would reduce environmental damage. That
principle establishes that consideration of environmental matters
must be more than a pro forma ritual. Clearly, it is pointless to
"consider" environmental costs without also seriously considering
108
action to avoid them.
The court made additional incisive comments regarding the importance of careful, critical analysis at all stages of the decisionmaking
process. These comments moved an attorney for the plaintiffs to suggest that the ".

.

. language couldn't have been better if the environ-

mentalists had written the opinion themselves."' 0 0 The AEC chose not
to appeal. 1 0
Other Cases. Though the decisions in Environmental Defense Fund v.
Corps of Engineers and Calvert Cliffs' CoordinatingCommittee v. AEC
demand strict agency compliance with the NEPA, no generalizations
concerning judicial interpretation of the Act can be made absent consideration of other NEPA cases. First, for example, it is still unclear
to what extent the NEPA will be applied to ongoing projects. The District of Columbia District Court enjoined the Corps of Engineers' partially completed Cross-Florida barge canal,"' on which construction
106. Id. at 20352-20353.
107. Id. at 20348.
108. Id. at 20356.
109. 3 NATIONAL JOURNAL 1925 (1971). In a statement to the nuclear industry
three months after the decision, Dr. James Schlesinger, the new Chairman of the
A.E.C., noted that from its inception the Commission had fostered and protected the
industry, but that it was now time for the industry to solve its own problems. The New
York Times reported the speech in an article headlined, "AEC Shifts Role to Protect
Public Interest." (October 21, 1971, at 1, 23).
110. After consultation with manufacturers, utilities, and environmentalists, it issued new guidelines on September 3, 1971. "Revising 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix
D," 36 Fed. Reg. 18071.
111. See, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United
States Army, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971).
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began in 1964 (pre-NEPA), and the Arizona District Court enjoined a
channel clearing project for which construction contracts were let in
1970 (post-NEPA). 112 By way of contrast, the Oregon District Court
decided that, since preliminary location decisions were made in 1967,
the NEPA was not applicable to a power line project for which construction contracts were let during 1970!lla In sum, there is still considerable confusion as to when, in a sequence of decisions, implementation of the NEPA will be required by the courts.
Second, from the environmentalists' perspective, much NEPA-based
litigation has not been as successful as might have been hoped. The
Supreme Court, and the District of Columbia Circuit and District Courts
refused to enjoin the AEC's project Cannikin, despite evidence that the
applicable impact statement may have been quite insufficient." 4 Also,
the District of Columbia Circuit and District Courts refused to enjoin
Army dumping of nerve gas into the sea," 5 and the latter court upheld
the adequacy of an Agriculture Department statement justifying a controversial pesticide-spraying program. 116
The vagaries of enforcement notwithstanding, a review of recent
NEPA cases serves to suggest the range of agency decisions having environmental implications." 7 While judicial review has been sought in
the traditional controversies over dams,"' roads," 9 and use of the na112.

113.

See, Sierra Club v. Laird, 1 ELR 20085 (D. Ariz. June 23, 1970).
See, Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Ore.

1970).
114. The Court of Appeals, in particular, noted, "We are left with difficult questions about the validity of the A.E.C.'s environmental statement."
Committee for
Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 3 ERC 1256 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 3, 1971).
115. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Resor, Civil No. 2394-70 (D.D.C. filed,
Aug. 12, 1970).
The district court denied injunctive relief and the D.C. Circuit
Court affirmed.
116. Russell Train, Chairman of the CEQ, implicitly suggests in the following
remark that all federal actions impact on the environment:
[I] don't believe it will ever be possible to put all environmental responsibilities
of the Federal Government into one agency. I believe that the . . . Ash
Council [decided] that such an objective would be impossible because you
would end up with all functions of the Federal Government in one department. Hearings on Environmental Data Bank before the Subcommittee on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., at 148 (1970).
117. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C.
1971).
118. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States
Army, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971); 2,606.84 Acres v. United States, 324 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3953 (1971); Akers v. Corps of
Engineers of the United States Army, Civil No. 70-349 (W.D. Tenn., filed Sept. 9,
1970).
119. E.g., Brooks v. Volpe, Civil No. 9144, 1 ELR 20286 (W.D. Wash., filed
April 6, 1971); Daly v. Volpe, Civil No. 9490, 1 ELR 20242 (W.D. Wash., filed
April 9, 1971); Elliot v. Volpe, Civil No. 70-869-M, 1 ELR 20243 (D. Mass., filed
April 20, 1971); Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238
(M.D. Pa. 1970).
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tional forests, 12 0 the courts have also been used to challenge funding of
12
a prison facility by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, '
funding of an apartment building by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 2 2 and funding of a sewage treatment plant by the
Environmental Protection Agency. 2 Also, under the NEPA, oil company subsidiaries have challenged federal termination of helium production contracts, 1 24 and detergent manufacturers have protested promul2
gation of federal phosphate detergent labeling standards. 1
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

The sheer diversity of the NEPA cases indicates the large number of
agency decisionmaking systems to which the Act can be held applicable-yet it is still too soon to render a general verdict on the NEPA's
administrative and judicial implementation. Administrative compliance
with the act is influenced by agency structures, values, and maintenance requirements. The CEQ may sometimes overcome administrative
reticence, but it is difficult to obtain a precise measure of its success.
While two cases demonstrate how the courts can vigorously enforce the
Act, a brief overview of other NEPA cases suggests that judicial relief
will not be unhesitatingly granted.
Because of aggressive citizen initiatives, agencies will, hopefully,
compile more complete records of their projects' environmental implications. In those instances where ecological consequences have been
exhaustively researched, and are expected to be grave and extensive,
perhaps agencies will reconsider committing themselves to a projected
course of action. But if environmental ends are continually subordinated to other ends, then the next generation will have, if nothing else,
a highly detailed record of how this generation systematically ravaged
the environment.
120. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d
232 (4th Cir. 1971); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971);

Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, Civil No. 5169-70 (D.C. Minn., filed Dec. 23, 1969)

[Amended complaint citing the NEPA filed Jan. 7, 19701.
121. Ely v. Velde, Civil No. 459-70-B, 1 ELR 20082 (E.D. Va., filed Jan. 22,
1971), aff'd 3 ERC 1280 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 1971).
122. Goose Hollow v. Romney, Civil No. 71-528, 3 ERC 1087 (D. Ore., filed
Sept. 9, 1971).
123. Gibson v. Ruckelshaus, Civil No. 5255, 1 ELR 20337 (E.D. Tex., filed
March 1, 1971).
124. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan. 1971), a 'd

3 ERC 1129 (10th Cir., Oct. 4, 1971).
125.

Lever Bros. Co. v. F.T.C., 2 ERC 1648, 1 ELR 20185 (D. Me. 1971).

The

district court denied an injunction. The manufacturers then moved for an injunction
pending appeal which was denied by a single judge in the First Circuit Court of Appeals, 2 ERC 1651, 1 ELR 20328 (Ist Cir., Apr. 20, 1971).
ently dropped before hearing by the full court.

The appeal was appar-

